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 Terrorism is generally recognized as  politically motivated violence that targets non-combatants, 
but a specific definition of terrorism remains elusive.  A globally recognized definition is difficult to 
establish because terrorism means different things to different people dependent on their vantage point 
or motivation.  In the United States most law enforcement bodies and agencies agree with the U.S. 
State Department's (2011) definition:   
1)   The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience.  
2) The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the 
territory of more than one country. 
3) The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant 
subgroups that practice, international terrorism. 
 
The U.S. State Department's definition includes a definition for international terrorism: the focus of this 
essay. International terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon considering the age of terrorism.  
Hoffman (1998) states that terrorism has been used for over 2000 years, but international terrorism as 
we know it today was made possible by technological advances.  This entry begins by reviewing 
pivotal historical events that led to terrorism's use as well as the underlying reasons for terrorism today.  
The essay then discusses the influence of political stability and culture on international  terrorism.  
Finally, a brief discussion of counter-terrorism strategies highlights the means by which terrorism is 
prevented.  
Early History of Terrorism 
 Before technological advances, most notably commercial air travel, almost all terrorism was 
domestic.  The only exception to this was a target nation that closely neighbored the country where the 
terrorists originated.  The first known terrorist organization to use violence was Narodnaya Volya; the 
name translates to “the People's Will.”  This Russian terrorist organization sought to free itself and the 
people of Russia from the tsarist rule.  The People's Will drew its motivation to commit terrorist acts 
from the creed that ideas result from deeds.  In essence, its members believed that their terrorist acts 
incited ideas (Hoffman, 1998). 
 The People's Will sought free speech, a constitution, and universal suffrage for the Russian 
people.  Sadly, after its successful assassination of Tsar Alexander II, its members were hunted by the 
government and killed.  The last of Narodnaya Volya was killed in 1883, but its cause did live on 
through the terrorist group Anarchist International who were able to resist tsarist rule (Pipes, 2003). 
 The actions and motivations of Narodnaya Volya highlight the complex nature of terrorism; the 
bad guys and good guys are hard to identify at times.  It has been argued that it takes decades to 
determine if a group was made up of terrorists or freedom fighters.  Often, it is the victors of conflict  
who define the heart of an organization (Hoffman, 1998).   The complexity of terrorism is highlighted 
quite well in the Armenian-Turkish conflict.  Even today, well over 130 years later, the details of this 
conflict are still disputed (Tavernise, 2009)  
 The conflict took place during the Ottoman Empire and began with the preferences of European 
traders.  These traders gave special treatment to Christians and Jews; thus, the Armenians were a 
privileged ethnicity.  This was not true before these traders arrived on the scene, when Muslims held a 
higher standing.  Russians soon invaded the empire and the Armenians supported their cause.  
Eventually, the Turks (Muslims) got their land back and passed the Tehcir Law which sought to deport 
Armenians.  This “deportation” was in reality genocide, and between 300,000 to 1.5 million Armenians 
were killed; this number is highly disputed (Tavernise, 2009).  In retribution, Marxist Armenians 
committed terrorist acts against the Ottoman Empire and succeeded in killing 517,955 Muslim civilians 
(Hoffman, 1998). 
 It has only recently been acknowledged by the Turkish government that the eradication of 
Armenians occurred (Tavernise, 2009) .  The Armenian-Turkish conflict is a prime example of 
convoluted conflict involving terrorism.  A pivotal event occurred shortly after the Armenian-Turkish 
conflict and subsequent fall of the Ottoman Empire: Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points speech.  This 
speech resulted in the U.S. failure to sign the Treaty of Versailles, but it set the path for the Atlantic 
Charter.  Woodrow Wilson was said to be ahead of his time when he wrote the speech.  In the speech he 
outlined a method to limit American colonial tendencies and influence in the governance of other 
nations.  It was not until 1941 that the Atlantic Charter mandated these rights be universal to all nations.  
In fact, signatories were surprised at how liberally the Atlantic Charter was written.  Churchill 
attempted to make Africa and Asia exceptions to the Charter (Hoffman, 1998).  Interestingly, it was 
also during this time that terrorism, as we know it today, became popularized. 
 During World War II the Japanese had astounded the people of many developing nations by 
defeating the British in Singapore.  This marked the beginning of a trend in which the British lost 
battles and the idea was planted that a super power could be vulnerable (Hoffman, 1998).  An amusing 
analogy highlights the importance of this point.  If you pay close attention during a circus, you will 
notice that the great elephant is tethered by a rope to a small stake that is buried in the ground.  This is a 
peculiar sight since the elephant could easily overcome the rope and stake and walk away.  Yet this rope 
and stake keep the elephant in place due to conditioning.  Since it was a calf, the elephant has been tied 
to a stake that it was unable to overcome.  After enough tries, the elephant begins to assume it can 
never free itself from the stake and rope, even though the stake has been gradually reduced to a small 
stick (Gaiennie, 2009).  The British defeat allowed developing nations to question their “rope,” if you 
will.  It was the Japanese that awakened the world to the vulnerability of the British and to question the 
British rule.  The Japanese were also able to control Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines and Hong Kong.  
 Following the Atlantic Charter, two colonies sought for independence, Algeria and Cyprus.  
Algeria was controlled by the French and Cyprus by the British.  In Algeria the Front de Liberation 
Nationale (FLN) was the primary organization in resisting French colonial rule.  The FLN grew out of 
frustration that the French did not relinquish colonial rule after they signed the Atlantic Charter.  Their 
exploits began with targeting only government offices and buildings but moved onto civilian targets 
after a lack of significant results.  After 5 long years of conflict with the French military, the FLN were 
successful in gaining independence for Algeria.  Cyprus' independence also grew from the expectation  
of what the Atlantic Charter meant for its signatories (Hoffman, 1998).   
 The independence of Cyprus is largely due to the efforts of the terrorist group Ethniki Organosis 
Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA).  The EOKA used hit-and-run attacks to undermine the British counter-
terrorism efforts.  The British simply could not protect all of the targets all of the time.  Expressing his 
frustration, a British commander stated, “...one does not use a tank to catch field mice, a cat will do a 
better job” (Hoffman, 1998, pg 59).  This sentiment is true whenever a grassroots insurgency arises.  
Military force, albeit mighty, is often laborious to employ and often undermined by smaller and more 
agile terrorist cells.  This will be discussed in greater detail later in the section reviewing the criminal 
justice system's response to terrorism (Hoffman, 1998).   
 One of the most persistent conflicts has been the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; it continues to this 
day.  To appreciate the magnitude of this conflict we must go back to biblical times to one of the most 
well known figures in the Bible, Abraham.  As a Semitic Nomad, Abraham became blessed by God by 
receiving the Covenant of God (Genesis 22:17-18, New International Version).  He married a woman 
named Sarah and they tried to have children but she was barren (Genesis 16:1, New International 
Version).  Sarah gave Abraham her blessing to have a child with Hagar, her handmaiden (Genesis 16:2, 
New International Version).  Hagar soon had a son, Ishmael (Genesis 16:16, New International 
Version).  Unexpectedly, Sarah miraculously became pregnant and also gave birth to a son, Isaac 
(Genesis 21:2, New International Version).  In time Sarah and Abraham released Hagar and Ishmael 
(now only a teenager) into the wilderness of Beersheba (Genesis 21:9-10, New International Version).  
While in the wilderness, they ran out of water and in despair a vision appeared to Hagar that Ishmael 
would be a great nation (Genesis 21:17-18, New International Version).  Today this great nation is 
know as the Muslim community . 
 Meanwhile, Abraham and Sarah raised Isaac and he received the Covent of God from his father 
(Genesis 25:5, New International Version).  When Isaac grew, he had two children named Esau and 
Jacob (Genesis 25:24, New International Version).  Esau was the eldest son but Jacob was favored by 
his mother (Genesis 25:28, New International Version).  When Isaac, who was now blind, was to give 
the Mantle of Leadership to the Esau, his mother tricked Isaac into giving it to Jacob (Genesis 27, New 
International Version).  Jacob changed his name to Israel and became the Hebrew Prince of God 
(Genesis 32:28, New International Version); therefore, the Jewish people were known as the children of 
Israel (Genesis 46:8, New International Version).  Thus, we now have Ishmael as the prophet and 
patriarch of Islam and Israel, the son of Isaac, as the last patriarch to the Jewish people. 
 The problem between the Muslims and the Jews arose when each claimed to be the rightful 
people of the Promise Land.  This land, promised to Abraham by God, is the source of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the motivation for countless terrorist events over the centuries.  Each has their 
claim and a resolution seems unlikely.  Much of the discussion about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
pertains to the ownership of Jerusalem.  This is considered the heart of the Promise Land (Rowley & 
Taylor, 2006).  Today, Israel has control of this land, but the Palestinians claim it should be theirs.  This 
conflict sets the stage for the countless violent incidents that occur to this day.  
International Terrorism 
 It has been said that without addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the War on Terror is 
nothing more than a “flimsy shield” (Hoffman, 1998).  The above discussion covered the background 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but to fully understand the most infamous of international terrorism 
events we must review how Israel gained independence from Britain.  Israel's independence started 
during WWII and was a direct result of the genocide of the Jews throughout Europe..  The terrorist 
group credited for the movement was Irgun.  Although WWII marked the time in which Irgun began 
seeking an independent nation for Jewish people, they suspended terrorism operations so that the 
British could focus on defeating Hitler.  Shortly after WWII, Irgun resumed terrorist operations and the 
British proved incapable of preventing all attacks in all locations.  Irgun's strategy was only not to lose; 
therefore, even unsuccessful terrorist attacks proved effective by damaging the prestige of Britain.  One 
of the most infamous of these attacks was the King David Hotel incident.  This attack targeted British 
soldiers working below the hotel.  After the incident newspapers related the attack to the war fatigued 
citizens of Britain.  Irgun's persistence paid off; in 1949 Israel gained independence (Hoffman, 1998). 
 The new Jewish state then expelled the Arab Palestinians living on the land, some 950,000 of 
them.  These Palestinians thought that the exile was temporary and that the Arab army was planning an 
attempt to conquer the land once again.  But the Arab army had lost the will to combat the Israelis.  
Meanwhile, the exiled Palestinians were living in refugee camps and continued to hold out hope that 
some army would come to their rescue; no such help arrived.  Nasser, the Egyptian President, took the 
opportunity to gain political support by giving weapons to Palestinian commandos.  These commandos 
began their attacks on the Israelis and the Israelis retaliated.  The British allowed the conflict to 
continue in the hope that a settlement would be established.  This began the seemingly never ending 
cycle of violence that constitutes the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  At times the fighting will 
settle, but inevitably the peace is interrupted by some level of violence (Hoffman, 1998). 
 Fast-forward to June of 1967.  The Israelis preemptively struck the Arabs.  The fighting ensued 
for 6 days, after which the Israelis gained control of Jerusalem, the heart of the Promise Land.  Today 
much of the discussion revolves around who can have control of Jerusalem, but Israel has yet to 
relinquish control of the city.  Much of today's international terrorism is a direct result of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  Terrorists targeting America cite the Israeli-US relationship that became 
publicized during the October 1973 War (Hoffman, 1998).  Real or imagined, terrorists reference  this 
relationship as a motivating factor in targeting the US and its allies.   
 Religion may be cited as a source of terrorism, but religion is a general term that encompasses 
both the spiritual and group dynamics of a population.  Terrorism can exist without religion, but not 
without group dynamics that perpetuate a culture of violence.  Thus, we can examine terrorism as the 
behaviors of a set of people.  Naturally, the discussion moves to why some pockets of the population 
resort to violence in order to achieve a political voice.   Terrorism is political violence; therefore, 
political stability is what all long-term counter-terrorism strategies seek.  When the people are content, 
little violence will occur.  International terrorism is a result of technological advances that allow a 
disturbance in one nation to effect another nation.  An example of this was when Black September 
murdered of all of the Israeli Olympic team members in Munich, Germany during the 1972 Olympic 
games.  This horrific event successfully put the Palestine Liberation Organization on the minds of all of 
the world's leaders (Hoffman, 1998).  The incident and the publicity of this incident would not have 
been possible without air travel and communication technology.  Essentially, the world has gotten 
smaller due to technology, thus, we must expect that international terrorism incidents will occur.  In 
addition, a smaller world means that all nations have a stake in all other nations achieving political 
stability.  Therefore, we must ask, “how do we achieve political stability?” 
Political stability 
 Although a purely historical review of terrorism would be interesting, history does not benefit 
counter-terrorism operations unless it is coupled with research that seeks to find commonalities 
between incidents.  Simply put, history can help us understand why terrorism occurs and how to 
prevent it.  Barring the outliers, history tells of a number of conditions that bring about political 
violence.  Terrorism, by definition, has a politically based motivation.  Traditionally, terrorism is not 
motivated by monetary gain and is generally committed by a group that shares some ideology between 
members (Forst, 2009).  In addition, terrorists accept the fact they may not live to see the benefits of 
their sacrifice; thus it is unlike other types of crime.  There are two overarching motivations for 
terrorists.  First, terrorists may want to augment the current government.  That is, the form or ideology 
of government is not being condemned; rather it is some function of government that is attracting 
terrorist motivations.  For example, the terrorist group ELF, which conducts and supports terrorist 
incidents in the United States, seeks to change policy and activities regarding the preservation of the 
environment.  The second motivation is to overthrow or overhaul the current government.  For 
example, as previously mentioned, the Russian terrorist group People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya), active 
during the late 1800s, desired to introduce such policies as universal suffrage, representation of the 
population in government, transfer of land to the people, and freedom of speech, press and assembly, to 
name a few (Hoffman, 1998).  These demands required a massive overhaul of the tyrannical Russian 
government.  Specific demands (involving the function of government) are more likely to be espoused 
by smaller terrorist groups and, conversely, large terrorist groups engender ideology that attempts to 
change more general aspects of government.  For instance, Al Qaeda’s mission is to change the forms 
of government for a large number of nations in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and the West (Forst, 
2009).  Conversely, radical Christian groups have committed a number of terrorist events in retaliation 
to abortion rights (Juergensmyer, 2003).  Although the motivation for these terrorist events is to 
encourage the government to change the laws, they are not likely interested in re-establishing a new 
government.  There is good reason why large terrorist groups rarely have specific goals.  First, large 
groups are developed by a general grievance of some population.  It is unlikely that many people would 
experience the same specific treatment by a government (foreign or domestic); instead, is it a general 
treatment by a government.  Secondly, and more importantly, large groups would not be able to decide 
on a specific demand.  When a group is large there is little that all members can agree upon; thus, 
general grievances are more likely to be espoused by these larger groups because focusing on more 
specific concerns may jeopardize membership.  International terrorism can be conducted by small or 
large groups, but for either there are formidable obstacles to success. 
 International terrorism has gained much media attention even though it comprises only 3% of 
terrorism globally (START, 2009).  Passengers of commercial airplanes would likely not expect such a 
minuscule figure in respect to terrorism throughout the world considering the long security lines and 
the intrusive security measures they now endure.  Although terrorists are less likely to commit 
international acts of terrorism, it is of great concern to developed nations such as the United States, 
Britain, and France who see themselves as victims of a foreign conflict.  But these developed nations 
my not be unwitting victims. 
  Huntington (1968) argues that developed nations that assist a developing nation in economic 
growth may increase the likelihood of political instability.  Traditionally, developed nations promote 
economic development in an effort to cause the nation to be politically and economically stable.  But as 
Huntington (1968) argues, political stability grows slower than economic development yet economic  
growth demands more political stability.  Therefore, economic assistance can be a detriment to political 
stability- in essence inviting terrorism if conditions are correct.  Thus, the political unrest due to 
political decay could be a direct cause of seemingly benign economic development.  Terrorists from a 
developing nation may recognize the detrimental effect of foreign influence and retaliate.  Thus, 
targeting a foreign power that is attempting to help a developing nation may be an accurate assessment 
of the source of the political unrest.  The lack of political stability in the face of economic growth is a 
possible reason terrorism abounds, but it is likely not the central reason; culture is a far greater 
motivation for terrorism.   
 Ferracuti (1982) found that subculture theory, a type of rational choice theory, explains 
terrorism the best.  Rational choice theory explains how certain death can still be a logical choice for a 
terrorist.  It is understood that a human’s natural survival instinct would prohibit a person from putting 
himself in danger, but exceptions to this human drive based in culture may explain why terrorists 
logically kill others and themselves.  Ferracuti (1982) states, “[d]eath per se cannot be accepted at the 
experimental level and must therefore be rationalized, attributed to chance or to natural processes, 
made into a symbol of an exceptional event, or denied and lived simply as a religious transition from 
life on earth to eternal life” (p. 136).  During times of war, a soldier can be encouraged to murder and 
understand that his or her life is in jeopardy.  Akerlof and Kranton (2004) found that military personnel 
are inculcated to put “service before self” (p.8) and must have “faith in the system” (p. 9).  A terrorist, 
therefore, creates this war culture and subjects him or herself to this rule.  No longer is the terrorist 
killing or being killed; instead he is part of a collective action against an enemy (Ferracuti, 1982).  
Hoffman (1998) argues that terrorists perceive themselves as freedom fighters and even use military 
jargon.  If captured, they expect treatment as prisoners of war.   
 Terrorism is complex and human.  As discussed above, economic, political and social conditions 
can provide the motivation for terrorism.  Those within the criminal justice system are tasked with 
protecting and providing peace; thus, we must enact policy that most directly remedies the political 
instability and violence.  The next section provides an overview of tactics used to address terrorism.  
Most of these solutions are political in nature because terrorism is politically motivated.  Other 
strategies involve military operations to directly quell a civil disturbance.  These methods are designed 
to directly or indirectly prevent terrorism.  Their importance cannot be overstated. 
Policy in Response to Terrorism  
 Counter-terrorism policy in a democracy is plagued by one ailment: security and personal 
freedom are opposing needs (Perl 2003).  Citizens expect terrorists to be dissuaded from attacking 
innocent civilians if civil society can implement security measures that prevent terrorists from planning 
and implementing an event.  Simultaneously, sectors of the military, the government, and society want 
to punish terrorists.  Citizens want the terrorists permanently stopped and the planning of future attacks 
prevented.  This creates tension between due process, individual rights, and general security because 
the most effective methods of attaining security are often the most personally intrusive methods.  This 
constrains counter-terrorism policy and belabors civil rights (Perl 2003). 
 Perl (2003) lists six rational methods to curb state or group terrorism: “diplomacy or 
constructive engagement, economic sanctions and inducements, covert actions, rewards for information 
programs, extradition/law enforcement cooperation, military force, and international conventions” (Perl 
2003, p. 7-12).  These measures are utilized by most nations to varying degrees.  A nation can choose a 
more aggressive stance than the U.S. or more diplomatic means.  Each of these measures are discussed 
in an attempt to establish the foreign policy paradigm.   
Diplomacy includes organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.), North American Treaty 
Organization (NATO), or the European Union, each of which may impose measures upon nations who 
employ terrorist tactics or sponsor groups that do so.  The use of such international organizations can 
prove to be the least aggressive and, therefore, the first measure used against a threat (Perl 2003).  
Constructive engagement can use various means to dissuade the support of a terrorist state or group.  
Methods such as international legislation can prohibit states from forming alliances with groups 
suspected of terrorist behaviors.  Sanctions for prohibited activities are often economic. Terrorist 
groups rely upon the media to disseminate their message, but if that message were to be clouded, the 
target nation may undermine the group’s purpose. Furthermore, an international and collective use of 
the media can also prove fruitful (Perl 2003).   
 Economic sanctions have been used and will continue to be used to deny terrorist states or 
groups the funds they need to act.  Economic manipulations may urge those who support terrorist 
groups to discontinue their association.  On September 23, 2001, President Bush enacted Executive 
Order 13224 which froze 27 bank accounts suspected of supporting Osama bin Laden.  By November 
2002, an estimated $121 million dollars were frozen to deny funds to terrorist groups.  But individual 
states can also be reprimanded with economic sanctions which discourage the support of terrorist 
groups (Perl 2003).  The use of such tactics can be categorized as those that restrict trading, 
“technology transfer, foreign assistance, export credits and guarantees, foreign exchange and 
capitalistic transactions, and economic access” (Perl 2003, p. 9).  These forms of economic sanctions 
all rely on the fact that terrorists, state sponsored or otherwise, are rational because sanctions reduce the 
benefit of terrorism.  In reality, terrorists need money to continue operations.  Effective economic 
sanctions can cripple a terrorist organization by encouraging terrorists to seek other forms of 
employment and reduce the market supply of illegal arms.   
Economic inducements attempt to reduce terrorism by reducing the benefits of employment by 
terrorists groups.  This policy functions well in conjunction with economic sanctions that can reduce 
terrorist group employment potential.  Economic inducements seek to improve economic conditions 
and stem from the popular belief that those who join a terrorist group are unskilled workers.  Education 
and assistance programs are utilized to improve the lives of potential terrorists and change their outlook 
on governmental motives (Perl 2003).  Policies of this kind find ancestry in Merton’s strain theory 
through Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) subculture theory.  This theory suggests implementing social 
programs to assist those who cannot reach cultural goals using societal means (Agnew and Cullen 
1999).   
Another means to combat terrorist groups is employing teams designed for covert action.  The 
use of these teams in conjunction with reliable intelligence can fragment a terrorist group and raise the 
costs of terrorism.  Covert actions are comprised, in large part, of non-aggressive behaviors.  Effort is 
placed on gaining knowledge of the working strengths and weaknesses of a group and, if needed, 
assisting a country with their operations.  Assistance may be in the form of arms or intelligence, but 
credit for assistance is kept clandestine.  Covert operations may entail the interception of unlawful 
deliveries or a preemptive strike on a terrorist group before an event can come to fruition.   
Rewards for information programs attempt to find suspects by financially compensating 
informants or those who hunt terrorists.  This method can support unethical practices that cannot be 
monitored, yet the outcome can be beneficial.  In the case of Mir Amel Kansi and Ramzi Yousef, the 
Rewards for Information program proved fruitful (Perl 2003).  Programs that reward information on 
terrorists raise the operating costs of terrorism; terrorists face greater levels of difficulty in ensuring 
secrecy.  Kenny (2007) argues that the costs associated with maintaining secrecy are substantial.  
Larger terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, face a far more significant threat and are therefore 
hampered from operating at full potential (Kenny 2007).   
Law enforcement cooperation can be a useful tool to combat groups that cross jurisdictions to 
commit the terrorist act or to evade local law enforcement by increasing costs and the probability of 
apprehension.  However, jurisdictional jealousies routinely allow information to remain undiscovered, 
terrorists to infiltrate new areas, and resources to be inefficiently dispersed (Perl 2003).  One tool that 
can benefit the prosecution of terrorists is extradition.  Legal cooperation between governments 
allowing extradition of terrorists, known as a memorandum of understanding, can not only permit 
prosecution of a terrorist event, but can also lead to valuable information on other suspected terrorists 
(Perl 2003).   
An obvious method to oppose the endeavors of a terrorist state or group is through military 
force.  Today, this method has become, more than anything, a measure of military technology and 
might.  Yet mistakes can undermine a mission.  Civilian casualties caused by the decisions of a foreign 
or domestic government can cause resentment and depict the nation as an oppressive force.  Civilian 
casualties can strengthen a terrorist organization’s fervor and increase a population’s dissent, therefore 
generating higher recruitment rates (Perl 2003).  Ideally, military operations should ensure success and 
deter the rational terrorist, but this is easier said than done.   
The final tool to curb terrorism is international conventions.  Organizations such as the 
Convention for the Marketing of Plastic Explosives and the Anti-Terrorism Financing Convention serve 
to construct a community that resists acts of terrorism.  Policies of the organizations can impede or 
even dissuade terrorists.  For example, the plastic explosives industry assisted law enforcement by 
adding a “tagging” ingredient to explosives.  These tags were visible using a special lamp and were 
designed to allow law enforcement officials to track explosives used in an incident more easily.  The 
encouragement of extradition and prosecution of those committing acts of terrorism make these 
conventions valuable (Perl 2003).   
Diplomacy or constructive engagement and international conventions carry the least resistance, 
yet such methods may reap the fewest rewards within a targeted amount of time.  Covert actions and 
military force face the greatest amount of resistance due to the high risk and financial burden, but they 
can prove to be the most productive (Perl 2003).  A moderate government would seek those sanctions  
that lie in between. Criminal justice bodies are often praised for apprehending and prosecuting 
terrorists, but far less glamorous yet more effective is the community policing strategy.   Community 
policing introduces a force that has the potential to change the preferences of community members 
away from terrorism.  It can address the concerns of citizens and prevent violent rebellions from 
gaining momentum.  U.S. General David H. Petraeus (2007) argues that victory can only be attained 
when the host nation’s people actively support the cause of counterinsurgency forces.  Therefore, 
effective counter-terrorism strategies must revive the confidence that citizens have for their 
government.  Community policing is designed to bring about such an outcome.  The results of 
community policing in addressing group deviance is evident in anti-gang programs.   
 Akerlof and Yellen (1994) express the vital nature of community values in deterring gang 
behaviors.  They found that communities that fear reprisal from gangs and do not trust the motivation 
of police are more willing to allow gang activity to occur unreported.  When communities trust the 
police and embody values that encourage cooperation, reporting is likely and, therefore, gang activity is 
effectively deterred.  Although the motivation for terrorist activity differs greatly from the motivation 
for gang behaviors, the community’s central role in preventing and reducing both activities is evident.   
If communities regarded the acts of terrorists to be abhorrent, insurgents would have no place to live or 
hide.   
Conclusion 
 This entry has briefly reviewed international terrorism by examining history, discussing root 
causes and identifying counter-terrorism strategies.  The counter-terrorism field is vast and includes a 
countless array of facets that directly impact terrorism incidents.   This entry has highlighted that 
terrorism is political in nature.  Populations willing to sacrifice themselves for change have been both 
beneficial and detrimental to the state of the world today.  The world now praises the independence of 
states such as Israel, but their independence would not have been possible without terrorism.  On the 
other hand, abhorrent acts such as 9/11 show the horrific impact of terrorism.  In sum, terrorism is a 
tactic; it can be used for good and bad ends and only history can dictate the appropriateness of its use.  
Counter-terrorism strategies have proven effective, but political stability is the ultimate solution to 
terrorism.  Because we live in a smaller world today than ever before- thanks to technology- the 
political stability of any one nation is a concern for all nations.  Therefore, U.S. foreign policy is crucial 
in the fight against terrorism.  
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